We consider two-user multiple access games in which one player (primary user) is interested in maximizing its confidential data rate at the minimum possible transmission power and the other player (secondary, cognitive user) employs eavesdropping as a leverage to maximize its data rate to a common destination at minimum transmission energy. For the non-cooperative static game, Nash equilibria in pure and mixed strategies are derived and shown to be Pareto inefficient for certain ranges of channel gains and energy cost parameters, when channel gains are common knowledge. A Stackelberg game formulation is then considered where the primary user is the leader. Interestingly, it is shown that the secondary user is forced to play as the follower where the Stackelberg equilibrium dominates the Nash equilibrium, even if the eavesdropper channel is better than the primary channel. Here, the Stackelberg utility achieved Pareto dominates the achieved Nash utility. Finally we study the unknown eavesdropper channel case numerically where the primary user has only statistical knowledge about the channel gain. We compare the results to the first scenario and show that it is not always beneficial for the cognitive user to hide the actual eavesdropper channel gain.
I. INTRODUCTION
Research in Cognitive Radio Networks (CRNs) is motivated by wireless spectrum scarcity with respect to the ever growing demand of spectrum resources [1] . Recent studies show that the spectrum is inefficiently utilized by current licensees [2] . Cognitive Radio has been proposed as means of solving this problem.
Game theory has been extensively employed in the analysis of Wireless Networks problems in general and CRNs in particular [3] , [4] . Specifically, the Multiple Access Channel (MAC) is one of the basic channel models that have been well studied using game theoretical techniques. For example, in [5] , a multiple access game is considered where a coordination signal is used to determine the order of successive interference cancellation at the destination.
Design of resource allocation algorithms for fading multiple access channels is studied in [6] using Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium concepts. In [7] , cooperative random access and cooperative token ring are studied using coalitional game theory. A comprehensive survey on game theoretic approaches for interference free multiple access in wireless networks, where different users transmissions are orthogonal, is presented in [8] .
Due to its broadcast nature, a large challenge in wireless networks is security. Thus issue is even more stressed in cognitive radio settings. Adversarial activity is usually adopted by users to cause damage to the attacked system.
As an example, malicious activity in a CRN was previously studied in [9] , where the malicious users are attackers aiming to degrade performance of the primary system through different methods like routing disruption and traffic injection. In [10] , a Stackelberg game is studied in which transmissions of a trusted cognitive users can improve secrecy of primary users (PUs) with respect to an external eavesdropper. Other examples of security attacks in CRNs can be found in [9] as well.
In this paper, we consider adversarial activity where cognitive users have a different goal. Specifically, secondary users (SUs) can employ their capability (e.g., eavesdropping) as a leverage to maximize their own performance: the attack may be used as a threat to the primary system. In our model, SUs 1 gain access to the spectrum through leveraging their eavesdropping capability. In a system where both PUs and SUs transmit to a common destination (e.g., base station or access point), SUs threaten the primary system by compromising the privacy of the primary traffic through eavesdropping. This threat possibly forces PUs to lower their transmission power levels to minimize the amount of eavesdropped packets. Consequently, SUs can achieve higher rates since interference from primary to secondary transmission will be lowered, as well. We employ physical layer (information theoretic) security measures [11] and use game theoretical analysis to study this adversarial situation. We characterize equilibrium points and hence the optimal resource allocation for each of the primary and secondary systems.
To the best of the authors knowledge, this work is the first to consider leveraging eavesdropping capabilities to access channel in a cognitive radio setting. In our model, the PU is interested in maximizing its secure (confidential) data rate while transmitting at the minimum possible power. The SU wishes to transmit best effort traffic to a common destination D while at the same time minimizing its energy consumption. To this end, SU threatens to eavesdrop the transmission of PU to increase its utility. In particular, in our model, SU is equipped with a half duplex wireless transceiver and it employs a time division scheme where the available time is divided between transmitting its own information and eavesdropping the information transmitted by PU, subject to a linear energy cost. The contributions of the paper are as follows. First, Nash Equilibrium (NE) is characterized for the static game in both pure and mixed strategies. For certain ranges of the channel coefficients and energy cost parameters, the equilibrium point is shown to be inefficient and reveals a lose-lose situation. A leader-follower game is then formulated in which PU is the leader who specifies its strategy and then the follower reacts so that its utility is maximized. In this case, Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE) is characterized and shown to dominate, in the sense of Simaan [12] , the NE and hence the follower is forced to comply with this strategy. In these games, we first assume that all channel gains are common knowledge to both players. Then, we analyze the more realistic scenario when PU has only statistical knowledge about the channel gain of the eavesdropper. Here, the cognitive user has the ability to either hide or reveal the actual value of the eavesdropper channel coefficient. We show that its not always beneficial for SU to hide this information from PU, especially when secondary channel gains are low.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides the required background from game theory and information theory. In Section III, we present our game setup and derive its NE for all values of channel conditions and energy cost parameters. In addition, we show via examples how the derived equilibrium points can be inefficient. Stackelberg formulation is then considered in Section IV and the SE is shown to Pareto dominate the NE for all ranges of channel coefficients when PU is the leader. The effect of unknown eavesdropper channel at PU is then considered in Section V. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we review results from information theory about the multiple access channel and the wiretap channel that we need in our game formulation. Moreover, we present certain definitions from non-cooperative game theory that are essential in our analysis. The two-user multiple access channel is a well known channel model in the network information theory [13] .
A. Multiple Access Channel and Wire-tap Channel
Let the channel capacity function be defined as C(x) = 1 2 log(1 + x), where logarithms are taken to the base 2. The capacity region of a channel defines the achievable rates so that receiver can decode the information reliably, i.e., with an arbitrarily small probability of decoding error. For a two-user Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) Multiple Access Channel (MAC), the capacity region is a pentagon given by
where R 1 (·), R 2 (·) are the achievable rates for transmitters 1 and 2, respectively, P 1 , P 2 are the transmission power levels, a > 0, c > 0 are the (constant) channel power gains and noise is assumed to have unit variance. The capacity region (1) is shown in Figure 1 for the channel model depicted in the upper part of Figure 2 , where we assign user 1 to be PU and user 2 to be SU. The two corner points of the capacity region are achieved by successive interference cancellation where the order of decoding at the destination determines the corner point [13] .
In this paper, we employ rate expressions on the boundary of the region (1). Specifically, we assume that the destination operates at point x in Figure 1 , i.e., it always decodes SU first in the interference cancellation decoder and hence gives priority to PU. Consequently, the achievable rates at the destination for PU and SU are given by
We note that rate pairs on the boundary of the capacity region (2) can only be achieved when both transmitters coordinate the codebooks and rates used in the channel coding [13] . If no coordination is assumed, then interference of each signal on the other will affect achieved rates of both users.
In the presence of an eavesdropper, the achievable secrecy rate of a transmitter is a the rate at which the entropy of the sender's message at the eavesdropper is arbitrarily close to the entropy of the message itself, given the received signals. In other words, the secure rate is the rate at which the message of sender is almost independent from the received signals at the eavesdropper. Achievability schemes (i.e., channel coding) are designed to maximize the confusion at the eavesdropper while maximizing the reliable rate at the legitimate receiver by exploiting the wireless channel characteristics such as noise and fading. For the Gaussian channel, the secrecy capacity is given by [14] 
for a ≥ b and R s (P ) = 0 otherwise, where a, b > 0 are the channel gains of the legitimate receiver's channel and the eavesdropper channel, respectively. The wiretap channel is sketched in the lower part of Figure 2 In our game, we assume that SU employs a half duplex transceiver and can either transmit to D or eavesdrop the transmission of PU at any given time. Thus, the channel model during SU's transmission is a multiple access channel, while it is a wiretap channel during eavesdropping, as shown in Figure 2 . Throughout the paper, we refer to the channel between PU and D as the primary channel, the channel between SU and D as the secondary channel, and the channel between PU and SU as the eavesdropper channel. Our network model is appropriate for CRNs for multiple reasons. First, when SU is transmitting information to the common destination D, it is given a lower priority than PU. This is clear from the achievable rate (2): the transmission of PU causes interference to SU and hence SU's achievable rate decreases with increasing transmission power of PU. Through the threat of SU, PU may be forced to decrease its transmission power P 1 and hence SU achieves higher data rate, as will be discussed in the next section. Finally, as discussed in Section IV, the analysis reveals that SU is forced to follow PU in a leader-follower game.
B. Game Theory Basics
Game theory provides an analytical framework to analyze situations of conflict between multiple decision makers that are rational, intelligent and selfish. These attributes accurately characterize wireless devices designed to optimize their own performance. Here, we borrow definitions from [15] and [12] that are needed for equilibrium analysis in the following sections. A strategic game is any G of the form G = (N , (S i ) i∈N , (u i ) i∈N ), where N is the set of players in the game. Let the utility of a player be given by u i (s i , s −i ) where s i ∈ S i is the pure (deterministic) strategy (or action) of player i chosen from the set of available strategies S i and s −i is the strategy profile of all other players except for player i chosen from × j∈N −{i} S j . In the following definitions, we focus on two-player games, i.e., N = {1, 2}. 
This definition implies that at an NE, no user has incentive to unilaterally deviate to other operating points. Assume there exist two well defined unique mappings T 1 : S 2 → S 1 and T 2 : S 1 → S 2 such that for any fixed s 2 ∈ S 2 ,
, ∀s 1 ∈ S 1 and for any fixed
defines strategies that are best response to each strategy chosen by the other player. Let the set
} for i = 1, j = 2 and i = 2, j = 1 be called the rational reaction set of player i and let
Note that any pair in the set D 1 ∩ D 2 is an NE according to Definition 1.
Hence, a strategy profile S is an NE if and only if the strategy of every player in S is a best response to the other player's strategy.
When mixed strategies are allowed, Definition 1 is written for expected utilities instead. Let f i : S i → [0, 1] be a mixed strategy for player i which defines a probability density function over
Here, we define supp(f i ) as the set of actions for player i with positive probability in the mixed strategy
At any Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium (MSNE), strictly dominated actions can not be assigned positive probability [16] . Here, an action s i ∈ S i for player i is strictly dominated if there exists a mixed strategy
The following proposition helps in the characterization of MSNE [16] .
is an MSNE if and only if for each player i there exists some c i ∈ R such that
That is, at an MSNE, each player chooses the support for its mixed strategy so that it contains only pure strategies that leads to best response to the other players strategies. One important result about MSNE is that for any continuous game, i.e., game with continuous utility functions, there exists at least one NE point in mixed strategies [16] .
A generalization of the strategic form game is the Bayesian game [17] where some players have private information about the game that other players do not have. A Bayesian game takes the form
where T i is the set of types of the i th player that specifies the information player i only knows about the game and p i is the probability function specifying what player i believes about the other players' types given its own type.
Here, it is assumed that each player i knows the structure of G b and its own type t i ∈ T i . A Bayesian Equilibrium (BE) is an NE for G b such that each player maximizes its expected utility. Therefore, the Bayesian game assumes that users are risk neutral.
The last type of game formulations we employ is Stackelberg games. In a Stackelberg game, we have a leader that makes a decision about its own strategy and followers who then choose their strategies accordingly. In the following definitions, we fix player 1 as the leader and player 2 as the follower. The leader chooses the strategy that maximizes its utility from the rational reaction set of the follower.
Definition 2:
A Stackelberg equilibrium strategy is a strategy pair (s 1 ,s 2 ) ∈ D 2 such that
In this paper, we sometimes use the shorthand Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE) to mean Stackelberg equilibrium strategy. We also use the shorthand SEP (respectively SES) to indicate an SE with the primary user (respectively secondary user) as the leader.
The utility of the leader is a well defined quantity [15] and is given bȳ
A Stackelberg equilibrium strategy for the leader may not exist in general [15] . In this case, however, an ǫ-SE can possibly exist in which the leader achieves utility ǫ close toū 1 .
Definition 3:
Let ǫ > 0 be a given real number. Then, a strategys 1ǫ ∈ S 1 is called an ǫ-Stackelberg equilibrium strategy for the leader if
One important property is that an ǫ-SE always exists in a game G ifū 1 is finite [15] .
From Definitions 1, 2, it can be seen that the utility achieved by a user in a Stackelberg game under its own leadership is always at least as good as the utility achieved under any NE for the same game [15] . This fact motivates the following definition.
Definition 4:
A Stackelberg equilibrium strategy (s 1 ,s 2 ) with player 1 as the leader is said to dominate an NE
In case (11) is true, both the leader and the follower would better choose to play the Stackelberg game under the leadership of player 1. In Section IV, this property will be vital to show that SU accepts to be a follower in a Stackelberg game that leads to more efficient performance for both players.
III. COGNITIVE EAVESDROPPER NASH GAME
We consider a two-player static non-cooperative game G where the players are PU and SU. In this game, the strategy of PU is to select transmission power level s 1 = P 1 ∈ [0,P 1 ], while the strategy of SU is to choose a fraction s 2 = α ∈ [0, 1] by which it divides the total available time T into transmission time αT and eavesdropping time (1 − α)T . Without loss of generality, we assume T = 1. Note that PU is transmitting all the time while SU is either transmitting its own data or eavesdropping the primary traffic.
PU is interested in maximizing its secure rate to the destination at the minimum power cost. The utility function of PU is given by
where γ > 0 is the unit power cost. The second term in (12) reflects the rate eavesdropped by the cognitive user.
For example, when α = 1, SU is transmitting all the time and the eavesdropped rate is zero. Note that there is no interference term due to transmission of SU since we consider the optimal multiple access scheme in which the traffic of SU is decoded first and then subtracted from the received signal using interference cancellation.
We assume that SU is bounded by a maximum power constraintP 2 . SU usesP 2 as its fixed transmission power level over the entire transmission period. In addition, we assume that SU is penalized for energy consumption using a linear cost function. The utility function of SU is thus given by
where β > 0 is the energy cost per unit transmission time. In this section and in Section IV, we assume that a, b, c, γ, β,P 2 ,P 1 are common knowledge. Hence, the games considered in these sections are non-cooperative static games with complete information. The goal of each user is to maximize its own utility by selecting the appropriate strategy given the knowledge of the other user's utility function.
The following notation will be useful in our analysis of the game G. We define P * (α) as PU's power level that maximizes u 1 (P 1 , α) for a given α ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, P * (0) and P * (1) are the primary power levels that maximize the functions u 1 (P 1 , 0) and u 1 (P 1 , 1), respectively. Also we define the threshold power level Q as
where the slope of the function u 2 (P 1 , α) is positive if P 1 < Q.
To ease our characterization of the NE of G, the result is separated into two cases. In the first, the primary channel is assumed to be stronger than the eavesdropper channel, i.e., a ≥ b. Here, we focus our analysis only on pure strategies. This is made possible without any loss of generality since the strategy sets are convex and the utility functions are concave in the corresponding variables [15] in this case, as will be given in Theorem 1. In the second case, the complementary case a < b is considered. In this case, mixed strategy Nash equilibria may exist and hence an extended argument is required. The result of this scenario is presented in Theorem 2. The following Lemma characterizes the structure of the function u 1 (P 1 , α).
Lemma 1: For a given α, P * (α) maximizes the function u 1 (P 1 , α) with respect to P 1 , where
Proof: Given some strategy α of SU, the best response for PU, i.e., P * (α) is given as
Using the second derivative test, it can be shown that u 1 (P 1 , α) is concave in P 1 if P 1 ≥P (α) and convex otherwise. For the concave region (i.e., P 1 ∈ [P (α),P 1 ]) and by setting the first derivative of u 1 (·) with respect to P 1 to zero and solving for P 1 , we get the expression for P ′ (α).
For the convex region, the maximum is on the boundary of the interval [0,P (α)]. Then, from the continuity of u 1 (·), the expression for P * (α) follows and the proof is complete.
The following Theorem characterizes the unique NE of the game G for the case a ≥ b.
Theorem 1:
For the game G, if a ≥ b, then the unique NE is
where α Q ∈ [0, 1] is the time fraction of SU that solves the equation P ′ (α) = Q andγ = γ ln(4).
Proof:
We show that the intersection of the best response correspondences of PU and SU are exactly the points in the Theorem. Therefore, no user has incentive to deviate unilaterally from such points and the conditions of Definition 1 are satisfied at these given points.
From Lemma 1, note that when a ≥ b,P (α) < 0 ∀α ∈ [0, 1] and hence P 1 ≥P (α) for all P 1 ∈ [0,P 1 ] and
The utility of SU u 2 (P 1 , α) is linear in α given P 1 and the slope of u 2 (P 1 , α) is non-positive for P 1 ≥ Q.
Consider the case Q < P ′ (0) and assume NE is at α = 0. Then, the best response for the primary player is
is an NE in this case. This proves the first case.
Now assume α * = 1. Then, the best response for the primary is P 1 = P ′ (1). When P ′ (1) < Q, the best response for SU when P 1 = P ′ (1) is α = 1 and hence (P ′ (1), 1) is an NE in this case.
For the remaining case, i.e., P ′ (0) ≤ Q ≤ P ′ (0), we note that SU is indifferent to the choice of α when PU chooses P 1 = Q since the slope of u 2 (Q, α) with respect to α is zero in this case. The intersection of the best response sets for the PU and SU is at α * = α Q . The solution α Q to the equation P ′ (α) = Q is given by
The parameter α Q is in the interval [0, 1] if and only if P ′ (0) ≤ Q ≤ P ′ (1) implying that it is the only NE in this case. Finally, note that P ′ (α) is an increasing function in α. Therefore, the relation P ′ (0) < P ′ (1) is always valid and we do not need to consider other cases. This concludes the proof.
The unique NE for the game G suggests the following. SU's decision depends on the choice of power level of PU with respect to the threshold value Q. Only when P 1 < Q, SU is able to achieve positive utility. If the threshold Q is high so that P * (1) ≤ Q (the last case in the theorem), then SU transmits all the time and the second term in the primary utility function vanishes. When α = 1, we have
An example of such a case is when the primary channel gain a is small and the secondary channel gain c is high for a given β. This can be seen from (14) and (23). In this case, interference from PU to SU at the destination is low and the secondary chooses to transmit for the entire available time. In addition, PU is not affected by the transmission of SU.
When c is small and a is large, we might have Q < P * (1). In this case, SU achieves zero utility (the remaining two cases in the theorem). In fact, SU is forced to select α = 0 in order to avoid negative utility in these cases.
Now we present a similar result for the case a < b. We start by computing the best response correspondences for each user. It is straight forward to see that for SU, T 2 (P 1 ) = 1 if P 1 < Q, T 2 (P 1 ) = 0 if P 1 > Q and
is an increasing function of α. To find T 1 (α), the following definition is needed. Letα be defined such that u 1 (P ′ (α),α) = 0
, and
which is similar to the case when a ≥ b. Ifα > 1, then u 1 (·) ≤ 0 for all P 1 and α, implying that the decision of PU is P 1 = 0.
The following theorem characterizes the Nash equilibria when a < b for all cases of channel conditions and energy cost parameters. In the following, p 1 (x) denotes the probability PU uses the (discrete) action x ∈ [0,P 1 ] in some mixed strategy.
Theorem 2:
For the game G, if a < b, the following are the only Nash equilibrium points
where g 1 is the mixed strategy for SU with an arbitrary probability distribution over supp(g 1 ) = [0,α], f 2 is the mixed strategy for PU with supp(f 2 ) = {0, P ′ (α)} and p 1 (0), p 1 (P ′ (α)) are the unique solution to the linear equations For the third case, the intersection of the best response sets is empty and there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
To find the support of the mixed strategy of PU, note that P 1 ∈ {(0, P ′ (α))}∪{P 1 > P ′ (1)} is never a best response to any strategy of SU and hence it can be discarded from the support. Using properties of MSNE from Section II-B and the fact that there exists at least one mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, then for some α ′ ∈ [0, 1], there exists some mixed primary strategy f ′ such that u 1 (P 1 , α
, where K is some constant. Observing the best response set of PU, it can be seen that α ′ =α is the only SU strategy satisfying this condition if support of SU is singleton. In addition, supp(f ′ ) = {0, P ′ (α)} and K = 0. To find f ′ , SU must has no incentive to deviate from α =α, i.e., E[u 2 (f ′ ,α)] = 0. It can also be seen that for any distribution
is an MSNE. This imply the third case in Theorem.
For the fourth case, the intersection of T 1 (·) and T 2 (·) implies the unique pure NE point (Q, α Q ). It can also be seen that if SU randomizes its action over the interval [0, 1] such that E[α] = α Q , then best response of PU is P 1 = Q. Any other (mixed) strategy for SU will not result in a NE.
Finally, when Q > P ′ (1), then α * = 1 for all P 1 in the rational reaction set of the PU. In addition, when
, no player has incentive to deviate. This concludes the proof.
We now discuss interesting properties of the Nash equilibria of G that motivates our investigation of the Stackelberg game and lead to the main result of the paper. While the following discussion holds for both considered scenarios of channel conditions, we only focus on the scenario a ≥ b for brevity.
We observe that, in the cases where Q ≤ P ′ (1), the NE point is inefficient: there may be other operating points where at least one player achieves higher utility while the utility of the others is not decreased. For example, assume 0 < Q. In the first case where Q < P ′ (0), if PU chooses a power level less than but arbitrarily close to Q, then SU is willing to transmit all time, i.e., chooses α = 1. In this case, SU achieves a strictly positive utility rather than zero utility achieved at the NE. In addition, since the eavesdropping term in u 1 (·) vanishes in this case, PU can achieve a better utility if u 1 (Q, 1) > u 1 (P ′ (0), 0). The same argument is valid for the second case where
To elaborate on our observation, consider the following numerical example. Let a = 2.5, b = 1, c = 3.5,P 2 = P 1 = 1, β = 1,γ = 1. According to (14) and (16), these values imply that Q < P ′ (0). In this case, the utility of PU at the NE is u 1 (P ′ (0), 0) = 0.0211 while its utility at P 1 = Q and α = 1 is u 1 (Q, 1) = 0.0631 which is three times better. When c is changed to c = 5 while keeping the rest of parameters the same, we have P
Here, α Q = 0.3667, u 1 (Q, α Q ) = 0.0681 and u 1 (Q, 1) = 0.1761, which is more than two times better than the primary utility achieved at the NE point. The utility of PU is sketched in Figure 3 for the cases α = 0, α = α Q and α = 1 when c = 5. The points maximizing each case are marked in addition to the the suggested operating point u 1 (Q, 1). The aforementioned operating points are not equilibrium points of the non-cooperative strategic game. For instance, in the case Q < P ′ (0), if SU chooses α = 1, PU can take advantage of this choice and select P 1 = P ′ (1) which will cause SU to achieve negative utility. Therefore, without communication and contracts between players, there is no guarantee that both players will play the strategy profile (Q − ǫ, 1) for an arbitrarily small ǫ > 0. However, if both players agree to play the game with some order and not take decisions simultaneously, better equilibrium points can be reached. In the following section, we formulate a leader-follower game in which the inefficient NE points of G are alleviated.
IV. COGNITIVE EAVESDROPPER STACKELBERG GAME
In this section, we show the existence of a Stackelberg strategy under the leadership of PU that results in better payoff values for both players in G compared to the payoffs achieved at NE. In a Nash game, each player chooses its strategy independently of the actual choice of other players. This property of a strategic game can be viewed as if players decide their choices simultaneously. It can also be viewed as a sequential decision process where each player has no information about the decisions of other players.
On the other hand, in a Stackelberg game, the leader of the game chooses its strategy first and then announces it to other players in the game (followers). Then the followers react to the strategy of the leader to maximize their own utilities. This leader-follower scenario can model the situation when a player has the power to enforce other players to be followers. In addition, a rational player is willing to play the Stackelberg game as a follower if this implies a better utility than that achieved at the NE of the game. If all players in the game achieve higher utility in the Stackelberg game with the leadership of some player than that achieved at the NE of the game, then this SE is said to dominate the NE according to Definition 4. For our game G, we have two possible Stackelberg games: in the first, PU is the leader and in the second, SU is the leader. Here, we show that an SE with PU as the leader (i.e., SEP) dominates the NE in Section III. Moreover, we show that any SE with SU as the leader (i.e., SES) can not dominate the NE of G. This implies that SU is willing to be a follower in a Stackelberg game in order to achieve better utility values.
To check the existence of an SE for our game, we start by computing the rational reaction set for SU, D 2 . It can be seen that
The following two lemmas establish the existence of an SEP and prove its dominance with respect to the NE for the game G, for the two different cases of channel conditions considered in Section III Lemma 2: For the game G with a ≥ b and for any given ǫ > 0, if the channel gains a, b, c and cost parameters γ, β andP 1 ,P 2 are finite, then there exists an ǫ-SEP. Moreover, if ǫ is sufficiently small, then the ǫ-SEP dominates the NE of G.
Proof: For the existence part, it suffices to show finiteness ofū 1 as in [15] . From Definition 3 and from (26), the utility of the PU for a Stackelberg game G under its leadership can be calculated as
If a, b, c and γ, β,P 1 ,P 2 are finite, then Q and P ′ (α) are finite for all α ∈ [0, 1]. Then,ū 1 is finite in all cases and existence follows from Property 4.2 in [15] . Now, fix some ǫ > 0 and consider the following strategy for PU.
For the first and last cases in (28), it can be seen that u 1 (s
In addition, for the other two cases, since u 1 (·) is uniformly continuous in P 1 , it can be seen that we have u 1 (s ) ) is sufficiently close toū 1 . For the utility of SU, it can be seen that u 2 (·) is the same as in the NE for the first and last cases of (28) and
2 ) concluding the proof. Lemma 3: For the game G with a < b and for any ǫ > 0, the following strategy for the PU is an ǫ-SEP.
Moreover, s 2 1ǫ dominates the NE of G for small enough ǫ. Proof: Follows a similar argument to the proof of Lemma 2 and is omitted for brevity.
When the game starts and according to the channel conditions and the cost parameters, PU and SU choose their strategies. By Definition 4, since the SEP in Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 dominates NE of G, then it can be seen that SU will prefer to be the follower in a Stackelberg game under leadership of the primary than to play Nash. At the NE of G, SU achieves zero utility for Q ≤ P ′ (1). However, at the SEP, SU achieves a strictly positive utility value in the third case in (28) and non-negative utility (according to channel conditions) in the second case.
Nevertheless, as stated in Section II, the utility of a player in a Stackelberg game under its leadership is at least as good as its utility in a Nash game. Consequently, SU may prefer to play a Stackelberg game under its own leadership and not to follow PU. The following Lemma, however, shows that for the game G, no SES dominates the NE. This result shows that PU can in fact enforce SU to be a follower in a Stackelberg game.
Lemma 4:
For the game G, there exists no SE under the leadership of SU that dominates the NE.
Proof: Consider the scenario a ≥ b. We start be computing the rational reaction set D 1 . It can be easily seen that
Now we check the SES and compare it to the NE point of G. The SES is given bȳ
We start by comparing to the last case in (21). Suppose the maximizer of (31) iss 2 =ᾱ = 1. 
) is linear and increasing for α <α and is multivalued at α =α. In addition, it is monotonically decreasing for α >α, with a discontinuity at α =α such that
2 ) at such equilibrium. This concludes the proof.
As given in Lemma 4, at any SES of G and comparing to the first two cases in (21), SU can choose α that leads to a larger secondary utility. However, this choice can only degrade the primary utility u 1 (·) and hence any SES does not dominate NE of G according to Definition 4. The results of this section are summarized in the following theorem where the proof follows from Lemmas 2, 3 and 4 and the fact that PU can threaten SU to play Nash.
Theorem 3:
For the game G, SU accepts to play as a follower and the outcome of the game is the SEP point in Lemma 2 and Lemma 3.
Remark 1:
Since the main result of the paper in Theorem 3 follows from the structure of the utility functions, i.e., linear cost function and time division scheme for SU, similar results can be derived for other threat games. For example, a threat game is recently considered in [18] where SU is a jammer user that divides available transmission time between transmitting own information and transmitting noise symbols.
Given that both players are rational and that both consider Nash and Stackelberg games, it is clear from Theorem 3 that both players will choose to play the Stackelberg game with PU as leader and SU as follower in all cases of channel conditions and energy cost parameters.
It can be seen from (13) that when the secondary channel is weak, i.e., c is low, the SU achieves negative utility if it is transmitting all the time. By threatening the PU via eavesdropping, the SU forces PU to play a Stackelberg game, which enables the SU to achieve a strictly positive utility. However, it is interesting to note that since the PU is the leader in this game, it specifies how much transmission is allowed to the SU by choosing ǫ > 0. No matter how small ǫ is chosen, SU is forced to comply with this specification. When the secondary channel is strong, i.e., c is large, interference on SU from PU is negligible, and therefore SU transmits all the time. In addition, the PU achieves the largest possible utility in this case.
The following is an example practical scenario for the game we consider: an SU joins an existing primary system and measures the received signals from PU to estimate the eavesdropper channel gain b. Assume that maximum power levels and energy cost are common knowledge in the game. Since D estimates the primary channel gain a, SU can also decode the feedback signals from D to PU to know a. Then, SU announces its presence and therefore D can measure the received signals from SU, estimate c and then feedback this value to both PU and SU. Here, we focus on the general case of asymmetrical channels where PU can not estimate b from the received signals from SU on the reverse channel. To this end, SU has information about a, b and c while PU has information about a and c only. PU can play the Stackelberg game only when it has information about b, in which case it announces its strategy, i.e., the primary power level and the value of ǫ. However, SU may not want to share this private information with PU in order to improve its own utility. This motivates our analysis in the next section.
V. HIDDEN EAVESDROPPER CHANNEL
In this section, we relax the assumption of the knowledge of the eavesdropper channel gain b at the PU that was used in the analysis in previous sections III and IV. Specifically, we assume that SU can choose to hide the actual eavesdropper channel gain b and PU has only statistical information about b. Hence we have a non-cooperative static game with incomplete information or a Bayesian game [17] . This model is more practical in the sense that SU would not be willing to reveal this private information in general.
As introduced in Section II, the objective of the players in the Bayesian game is to maximize the expected value of their utility payoff functions. Here, PU has a single type while the type of SU is the actual value of the eavesdropper channel gain b. The BE depends on the probability distributions that represent the belief of the players of the unknown parameters. In this section, we assume that PU believes that the eavesdropper channel gain is a realization of a Rayleigh channel. Hence, b is exponentially distributed with meanb, i.e., t 2 = b ′ with
. We assume that the average valueb is known to PU.
The objective of PU in this case is to select a power level to maximize the expected utility payoff function with respect to b, which is given by
where Γ(s, x) is the upper incomplete Gamma function and the last equality follows by [19] for P 1 = 0. It is known that for real and positive x, we have
where Ei(x) = t dt. The eavesdropping term in (32) is concave and increasing in P 1 which has similar structure to the eavesdropping term in the case of known eavesdropper channel in previous sections. Hence, it can be seen that E b [u 1 (·)] and the equilibrium of the game in this section will have the same structure as their corresponding parts in Sections III, IV. However, it is hard to maximize (32) analytically. Consequently, in the rest of this section, we perform a numerical study to compute and compare equilibria of the new game to the case when the eavesdropper channel is known at the PU.
Let the optimal response of the PU in the hidden b case be P b (α), i.e., P b (α) maximizes E b [u 1 (P 1 , α)] for some given α andb. Note that the function P b (α) is fixed for a givenb while the function P * (α) depends on the actual realization of b. In Figure 4 , we compare P b (α) to P * (α) for a realization of the eavesdropper channel gain b = 0.7 where we also set a = 3,b = 0.7, β = 1,γ = 1,P 1 =P 2 = 10. It is clear that both curves meet at α = 1 since the eavesdropping term in u 1 (·) vanishes at this point where Next, we compare the utility achieved by PU and SU in the two given scenarios for different values of the mean b and the secondary channel gain c. At the SEP, PU specifies the amount of information allowed for SU, i.e., the value of ǫ. In this section, we fix ǫ = 10 −2 . In Figure 5 , the utility of PU is plotted and compared for both cases of knowledge of b at the PU, when c = 0.7 and c = 1.3. We compare average performance where the utility is averaged over 10,000 realizations of b. In this comparison, we useP 1 =P 2 = 5, a = 3, and β =γ = 1. It is clear that knowing the exact value of b implies utility that is never less than the other case, i.e., knowledge of b can not hurt PU. In addition, the utility in the hidden b scenario approaches that of the known b scenario for larger range ofb when c is large. This result can be expected from Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, where the effect of eavesdropping (and hence b) vanishes when c is large enough so that Q > P * (1). Finally, we study the effect of hiding b on the utility of SU. When c ≤ 0.6, Q ≤ 0 and SU chooses α = 0 for all P 1 . In this case, u 2 (·) = 0 for either case of knowledge of b at the PU for all the considered range ofb. In Figure   6 , we plot u 2 (·) versusb using the same channel and cost parameters as in PU case. Here, it is clear that, for large values ofb, not revealing the actual value of b improves the utility of SU by confusing PU and lowering down its utility. However, for small values ofb, SU can in fact decrease its own utility by hiding the actual value of b.
This last result can be attributed to the following reason. First, whenb is small so that actual value of b is small with high probability, u 1 (·) and E[u 1 (·)] are concave in P 1 . Then, the decision of PU is according to (28) if SU reveals b and similarly if b is hidden. In addition, when c is small so that Q < P ′ (0) and Q < P b (0), we have a range ofb values such that
where in this range, the optimal decision for PU is P 1 = Q − ǫ in case of revealed b and P 1 = P b (0) for hidden b case. Hence, SU's decision (as a follower) is α = 1 and α = 0 in the cases of revealed and hidden b, respectively. Thus, SU is willing to reveal the actual value of b to achieve better utility in this case.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we analyzed a possible situation of conflict between a primary user and a cognitive user, each communicating with a common destination. Both transmitters are interested in maximizing their own data rate at the minimum possible energy. The cognitive half duplex user threatens the primary user to eavesdrop the primary traffic if it is not allowed to access the spectrum and transmit its own information. We studied the case when the energy cost is linear and we assume that the cognitive transmitter is given a lower priority in the successive interference cancellation decoder at the destination. Using tools from non-cooperative game theory as well as information theoretic transmission strategies, it is shown that the eavesdropping capability of the secondary user forces the primary user to lower down its power level so that the secondary user achieves a non-negative utility.
However, by using Stackelberg formulation, we show that the primary user specifies the allowable secondary rate and the secondary user is forced to comply to this specification, even if its achieved positive utility is small. Moreover, the result also holds for the stronger case when the primary channel is weaker than the eavesdropper channel. Furthermore, we presented a numerical study for the case when the eavesdropper channel state is known only statistically at the primary user. By not revealing information about the eavesdropper channel gain, we show that the cognitive user can improve its achieved utility, unless the eavesdropper channel is weak. In our future investigations, we will study systems with multiple cognitive eavesdropping users.
